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THE HOLOCAUST AND HISTORICAL METHODOLOGY

Edited by
Dan Stone



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Preface to the Series

JÖRN RÜSEN

At the turn of the twenty-first century the term "history" brings extremely ambivalent associations to mind. On the one hand, the last decade has witnessed numerous declarations of the end of history. Whether in reference to the fundamental changes in the global political situation around 1989/90, or to so-called postmodernism, or to the challenge to Western dominance by decolonization and multiculturalism, "history" as we know it has been declared to be dead, outdated, overcome, or even a myth at its end. On the other hand, there has been a global wave of intellectual explorations into fields that are "historical" by their nature: the building of personal and collective identity through "memory"; the cultural, social, and political use and function of "narrating the past"; and the psychological structures of remembering, repressing, and recalling. Even the subjects that seemed to call for an "end of history" (globalization, postmodernism, multiculturalism) quickly turned out to be intrinsically "historical" phenomena. Moreover, "history" and "historical memory" have entered the sphere of popular culture, from history channels to Hollywood movies, becoming an ever more important factor in public debates and political negotiations (the discussions about the aftermath of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, European unification, or the various heritages of totalitarian systems, to name but a few). In other words, after "history" was declared to be, like god before it, dead, "historical matters" have come back with a vengeance.

This paradox calls for a new orientation or at least a new theoretical expression. Indeed, it calls for a new theory of history; and such a theory should serve neither as a subdiscipline reserved for historians nor as a systematic collection of definitions, "laws," and rules claiming universal validity. What is needed is an interdisciplinary and intercultural field of study. Hayden White's deconstruction of the narrative strategies of the nineteenth-century historicist paradigm somehow came to be regarded by many as historical theory's famous

CHAPTER 14

The Holocaust and World History

Raphael Lemkin and Comparative Methodology

A. DIRK MOSES

Introduction

"The Holocaust and world history" is not a theme usually posited by philosophers of history or world historians. It is implied most often by scholars in Jewish studies. Holocaust historiography and genocide studies when they declare that the Nazi attempt to exterminate European Jewry is unique, unprecedented, unparalleled, or singular—compared to other genocides in world history. Such claims have roots that long precede the genocide of the 1940s. Already in 1846, the prominent German-Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz lamented, "This is the eighteenth hundred-year era of the Diaspora, of unprecedented suffering, of uninterrupted martyrdom without parallel in world history," indeed adding that this exile "was a history of suffering to a degree and over a length of time such that no other people has experienced."² If, by the middle of the nineteenth century, this "lachrymose history" (Salo Baron) of Jewish life since the destruction of the second temple constituted unparalleled suffering, the Holocaust that occurred a hundred years later required an updating of the world-historical claim. It has four not entirely compatible versions.

In the first, the Holocaust's irrational, purely-ideological character is stressed. Only the Jews were targeted for ideological reasons alone.³ Whereas in other genocides, an actual civil or military conflict subtended the targeting of civilians, the Holocaust was driven by hallucinatory ideology devoid of a social or political reality.⁴ The second version of the claim maintains that the Nazis aimed to destroy all Jews everywhere whereas other genocides were only local and partial.⁵ The third version invokes the significance of the Enlightenment

and technology. In this vein, Frank Chalk, in his pioneering co-edited book on genocide through the ages, figured the Holocaust's meaning in terms of its German perpetrators as representatives of western civilization:

The Holocaust has a special meaning for Western civilization: unlike the dead of ancient genocides, unlike the Canbans, the Japanese Christians, the Peguots and the Hereros, unlike the Armenians and the victims of Stalin's terror, the Jews and Gypsies were murdered in post-Enlightenment Europe by a people steeped in Western culture and rich in scientific knowledge. . . . We agree that in the challenge it poses to Western values from within our society, the Holocaust stands alone in the history of the West and in the history of genocide.⁶

Again, the judgment is made against the horizon of world history.

Still another version of the claim for the world-historical nature of the Holocaust is entailed by the special status of the victims: Jews as representatives of western civilization. Their intended destruction was therefore not a regular case of genocide, but rather a nihilistic attack on that civilization, that is, on the monotheistic values that the Nazis denied and violated: "God, redemption, sin and revelation."⁷ For this reason, Dan Diner refers to the Holocaust as a "profound civilizational break."⁸ This last point derives from an associated claim within Jewish theology and later, in a secularized form in Jewish politics, about the unique role of the Jews in human history. Graetz linked the question of unique suffering to the uniqueness of the victims' message when he wrote:

The proscribed, outlawed Jew, pursued over the entire earth, felt an exalted, noble pride in bearing, and in suffering for a doctrine which reflected eternity and by which the nations would eventually be educated to the knowledge of God and to morality, a doctrine from which the salvation and redemption of the world would go forth.⁹

The "exalted, noble pride in bearing, and in suffering for a" redemptive doctrine for humanity as a whole persists in the present day. Jewish religious and Israeli political leaders commonly refer to a special Jewish moral mission for humanity—and therefore a mission in world history. David Ben Gurion, for example, regarded Jews as a "unique people" whose destiny was to be a "light unto the nations," not by converting others as in Christianity or Islam, but by "redeeming" their ancestral land and establishing a just society.¹⁰ The Israeli president, Shimon Peres, underlined this point when he said in 2009, "The State of Israel is not merely the Jews' protective shield, but an ideal of historic import: to be a nation with a moral message."¹¹ Since 1945, the light of monotheism—"God, redemption, sin and revelation"—has been replaced by the secular ideals of human rights and minority protection via memory of the Holocaust as a unique genocide. This position is now the official Zionist and even United Nations (UN) position, exemplified by the successful Israeli attempt at the UN to institute a Holocaust Memorial Day.¹²

In all four assertions, human history becomes a backdrop for the uniqueness claim, a means of interrogating the Holocaust's world-historical import

Notes for this section begin on page 286.

and of endowing it with meaning: while, in turn, the Holocaust becomes an episode in the unique Jewish mission to "sanctify life and prevent murder and discrimination," that is, to impart the universal yet characteristically Jewish values of human rights and minority protection. In the fourth version, in particular, history becomes a kind of theodicy, the evil committed against the Jews eliciting the revelation of human rights and the genocide prevention. In this mode, Holocaust historiography is as much an ethical discourse, indeed a political theology, as a secular investigation.

For all their claims to universality, the uniqueness claims betray the generally ethno- and western-centric matrix from which they stem, much like Graetz's much earlier reasoning about why diasporic Jews did not become "a vagabond horde of gypsies"—it is because they had the civilizing Law.¹³ Their particularity is revealed by those who directly experience its effects. Any listener would naturally wonder what a Palestinian would think when Peres brands Israel's ethical mission and behavior:

We never set out to conquer. We did not rush towards domination. We rejected lordship, we fought discrimination, we protested slavery, we forbade violence. We believe in the preeminence of man, and we pray for *Tikkun Olam* [repairing the world] and world peace.

Indeed, non-European critics regard the humanism proclaimed in uniqueness positions as the very source of their own oppression, because it distinguishes so starkly between civilization and barbarism (or savagery). The view from outside the North-Atlantic consensus looks very different. W. E. B. Du Bois, for instance, wrote in *The World and Africa* in 1947 that

[t]here was no Nazi atrocity—concentration camps, wholesale maiming and murder, defilement of women or ghastly blasphemy of children—which the Christian civilization of Europe had not long been practicing against colored folk in all parts of the world in the name of and for the defense of a Superior Race born to rule the world.¹⁴

For this reason, the Nigerian writer Wole Soyinka, explicitly challenges the uniqueness thesis by arguing that the Atlantic slave trade, not the Holocaust, places "the first question mark on all claims of European humanism—from the Renaissance through the Enlightenment to the present-day multicultural orientation."¹⁵ Similarly, Frantz Fanon argued that the enduring problem was racism against and, exploitation of, non-whites: The Holocaust was an intra-European affair: "They are hunted down, exterminated, cremated. But these are little family quarrels." Whereas Jews are "slaves of an 'idea'" (antisemitism), he was enslaved "by his own appearance." Although he recognized certain commonalities in the Jewish and Black experiences, Fanon observed that the latter embodied the lowest cultural values, indeed evil itself, in Europe's collective unconscious.¹⁶ Finally, there is the criticism that the very ambition to write world history can evince a Euro-American hegemonic global imaginary, in fact

that their "world conquest and ideological structures ... produced the notion of 'world history' in the first place."¹⁷

Like the Holocaust uniqueness claims, these positions are indented to a particular stance and similarly questionable ethical discourse: equating antisemitism with anti-Black prejudice in the name of a generic anti-racism, flattening out the differences between all genocides, and attributing all evil in world history to European imperialism.

There are, then, two rival narratives about the meaning of the Holocaust and the course of modern global history: one that insists on its uniqueness, even if coded by other terms like "unprecedented" and so forth, and links Holocaust memory both to the universal values of human rights and the particular geopolitical agenda of Israel; and the other that regards the Holocaust less as a racially-driven genocide against a helpless minority than the logical outcome of imperial-racial conquest that it holds Zionism to embody. In both cases, blindness to their subject positions leads the protagonists of each narrative to a Schmittian friend/enemy stance and therefore to express empathy selectively in scholarly as well as political analyses. They impute malevolent (greed) or purely irrational motives (fanaticism/racial hatred) to the enemy-other, while their favored object's behavior is explicable by the laws of cause and effect: if their own "side" commits an act of violence, they were "forced" to do so *defensively* by the unbridled and unprovoked aggression of the enemy-other.

How does one avoid this competitive discourse of uniqueness and counter-uniqueness with their overshadowing geopolitical stakes and unsatisfactory methodological implications? Demonstrating that the underlying bone of contention is metahistorical claim-making about the Holocaust is the first task—as I hope I have shown here. The second task is to conceive of a viable methodology for historians writing about the Holocaust in world history. I do so by reconstructing the first serious attempt to address this question: that of Raphael Lemkin (1900–1959), the Polish-Jewish jurist who coined the term "genocide" in 1943 and wrote an unpublished world history of genocide after World War II. How did this complex figure, proud Jew and non-Zionist Polish patriot, conceive of world history and the Holocaust's place in it? We will see that he extricated himself from these metahistorical discourses in two ways: first, by proposing an immanent and cosmopolitan discourse that, by extending empathy to *all* victims of genocide and persecution, applied social scientific explanations to *both* victims and perpetrators; and second, by proposing a comparative approach that did not take any particular genocide as the prototype, model, or paradigm against which all the other are judged. He linked his moral purpose—to prevent and criminalize genocide—by seeking to explain its occurrence throughout history with the latest scholarly tools, deployed in an even-handed manner.¹⁸ Consequently, this chapter does not contextualize the Holocaust in world history, an impossible undertaking in a

short contribution. Instead, it explicates Lemkin's methodology as a guide for current and future research, which is thematized in the last section.

Raphael Lemkin, *World History*, and the Holocaust

It is no accident that Lemkin, a Jew from Eastern Europe, where consciousness and experience of nationality was so intense and where Jews had been persecuted for centuries, invented a concept to name the destruction of nationalities and pressed for its criminalization. Raised in an observant Jewish environment in which children studied the Bible and Jewish literature, his imagination was accordingly animated by the fate of nations and peoples. Like many Jews, he was drawn to the ancient Hebrew prophets. Suffering for their struggle, their "words lived long for they were deeds dressed as words." These sentiments would have been compelling to a youth who as a boy heard about pogroms, like that in Białystok, 50 miles away, in 1906. From Isaiah's call to "Cease to do evil; learn to do well; relieve the oppressed; judge the fatherless, plead for the widow" (Isaiah 1:17), he drew a cosmopolitan conclusion: it "sounded to me so urgent as if the oppressed stood now outside our door. The appeals for peace by converting swords into ploughshares seemed to recreate his presence."¹⁹ The hints he left in his unpublished autobiography indicate that, as a boy, he had also read widely about the persecution of human cultural groups since antiquity, beginning with the Roman Emperor Nero's attempted extermination of Christians. By learning about the travails of many ethnic groups over the centuries—the Huguenots of France, Catholics in Japan, Muslims in Spain—he concluded that ethnic destruction was a universal and enduring problem. While the persecution of Jews was part of this sorry tale—indeed, he called them "that classical victim of genocide"²⁰—his sympathies were for people everywhere; their suffering was part of the same human story: "A line of blood led from the Roman arena through the gallows of France to the pogrom of Białystok."²¹ His was a cosmopolitan rather than sectarian moral imagination that carefully negotiated the differences and similarities between cases, avoiding the temptation either to flatten out or to hypostatize distinctions.²²

I identified myself more and more with the sufferings of the victims, whose numbers grew, and I continued my study of history. I understood that the function of memory is not only to register past events, but to stimulate human conscience. Soon contemporary examples of genocide followed, such as the slaughter of the Armenians. It became clear to me that the diversity of nations, religious groups and races is essential to civilization because every one of these groups has a mission to fulfil and a contribution to make in terms of culture. To destroy these groups is opposed to the will of the Creator and to disturb the spiritual harmony of mankind. I have decided to become a lawyer and work for the outlawing of Genocide and for its prevention through the cooperation of nations. These nations must be made to understand that an attack on one of them is an attack on them all.²³

This quotation also makes clear that Lemkin couched his appeal to end genocide not in terms of abstract human rights and individual suffering, but in relation to an ideal of world civilization whose constituent parts were national, religious, and racial groups. However Jewish his roots and sympathies—he wrote for Jewish and Zionist newspapers in the 1920s while working as a lawyer in Poland—he seemingly did not become a Zionist or devote exclusive attention to the Jewish experience in World War II.

Misunderstanding his cosmopolitanism, Lemkin's commentators have accused him of illegitimately conflating the experiences of Jews and other groups, and of succumbing to a false (Christian) universalism, even implying that he did so for careerist reasons. The implicit charge that he neglected the metahistorical significance of the Holocaust is also based on the proposition that he did not fully understand the ambition of the Nazi genocide of Jews when he coined the term genocide.²⁴ Indeed, Lemkin thought the Nazis' policies unprecedented towards a number of victim groups, not just Jews. And even then he said they recalled other cases of genocide.

The above-described techniques of genocide represent an elaborate, almost scientific, system developed to an extent never before achieved by any nation. Hence the significance of genocide and the need to review international law in the light of the German practices of the present war. These practices have surpassed in their unscrupulous character any procedures or methods imagined a few decades ago by the framers of the Hague Regulations. Nobody at that time could conceive that an occupant would resort to the destruction of nations by barbarous practices reminiscent of the darkest pages of history.²⁵

For all that, Lemkin was acutely conscious of the Jewish experience. Although he fled his native Poland in 1939, he was well informed about subsequent Nazi rule. He devoted a separate chapter in his book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (1944) to the Nazi treatment of Jews, outlining the "special status" for them in every conquered country, as well as noting that they were "one of the main objects of German genocide policy." Indeed, they were "to be destroyed completely." He knew about the extermination camps.²⁶ His analysis of Nazi policy towards the Jews exemplifies his deft touch, shuttling back and forth between the similarities and specificities of the Jewish case.

In Sweden until 1941, he collected Nazi occupation documents and published them with extended commentary in *Axis Rule*, the book in which he introduced the genocide concept. In terms of Lemkin's view of historical progress, the Nazi occupation marked a dramatic regression to "the wars of extermination, which occurred in ancient times and in the Middle Ages," when the distinction between civilians and combatants was not well observed. This was how he described premodern genocide in *Axis Rule*:

As classical examples of wars of extermination in which nations and groups of the population were completely or almost completely destroyed, the following may be cited: the destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C.; the destruction of Jerusalem by

Titus in 72 A.D.; the religion wars of Islam and the Crusades; the massacres of the Albigenses and the Waldenses; and the siege of Magdeburg in the Thirty Years War [May, 1631]. Special wholesale massacres occurred in the wars waged by Genghis Khan and by Tamerlane.²⁷

The difference between barbarism and civilization was the distinction between civilians and combatants, and he saw international law as advancing this marker of civilization. From its inception, then, the genocide concept, like the Jewish genocide (Lemkin did not use the term Holocaust, which was not common currency in the 1940s), was embedded in a world historical frame.

Rather than study the Jewish case alone, Lemkin wanted to study genocide, which he said was a "generic notion" that applied to any human situation in the present and the past.²⁸ One could only understand the significance of the Jewish experience by relating it to the experience of others. His basic point was that genocide named a single evil—the destruction of peoples: "Genocide is a new word, but the evil it describes is old. It is as old like [sic] the history of mankind. It was necessary, however, to coin this new word because the accumulation of this evil and its devastating effects became extremely strong in our own days."²⁹ For that reason, he explained, "All cases of genocide, although their background and conditions vary, follow, for the most part, the same pattern. The object of destruction is a specific human group."³⁰

Already while he was lobbying for the UN Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of Genocide (1948), Lemkin turned to popularizing and legitimating his new concept by writing a major academic study of genocide. His correspondence with funding organizations and publishers shows that he was soliciting interest in a book on the subject as early as 1947 and that he had produced substantial draft chapters by the next year.³¹ Wanting to encourage the ratification of the UN genocide convention, he noted, "The historical analysis is designed to prove that genocide is not an exceptional phenomenon, but that it occurs in intergroup relations with a certain regularity like homicide takes place in relations between individuals."³² Lemkin's point was that genocide was not sacred but profane, to use Durkheim's distinction: far from the irruption of the inexplicable and irrational into normal life, it was the outcome of normal—and explicable—social interaction.

This agenda naturally told against making the Holocaust, let alone genocide, a metaphorical-singular event; after all, why devote a lifetime to criminalizing something so rare and specific that it is unlikely to recur? Moreover, how could countries be convinced to ratify the Genocide Convention if they thought it really pertained only to the Jewish Holocaust and therefore did not immediately concern them? Regarding his lobbying of UN delegates, he said that his *Axis Rule* book and "the Nazi experience was not a sufficient basis for a definition of genocide for international purposes. One cannot describe a crime by one criminal experience alone; one must (rather) draw on all available experiences

of the past."³³ Accordingly, Lemkin routinely referred to the world history of genocide in his public advocacy of ratification.³⁴

Alas, Lemkin's book never eventuated. Publishing houses and funding agencies did not think it a viable or marketable proposition.³⁵ His book proposals and chapters are scattered in three North American archives; while some are seemingly lost, it is still possible to reconstruct his project in considerable detail.³⁶ In his "Description of the Project" for his book, *Introduction to the Study of Genocide* (the first of a projected two-volume work), Lemkin detailed how he would combine legal and historical analyses for consciousness-raising purposes:

This book will deal with the international and comparative law aspects of this crime. Moreover, the particular acts of genocide will be illustrated by historical examples from Antiquity, the Middle Ages and Modern Times. These examples are necessary not only to prove that genocide has always existed in history, but also to explain the practicality of the Genocide Convention which up to now has been ratified by the parliaments of 58 nations.³⁷

The project was to be interdisciplinary because genocide, like the nationhood it attacked, was multidimensional.

The etiology and the reasons motivating the crime of genocide in different periods of history and in different cultures will be examined. The research will deal also with matters of psychology, economics, political science and cultural anthropology; the latter playing a great part in cases where genocide can be explained as resulting from a cultural conflict.³⁸

Why did genocide occur? Lemkin listed a number of hypotheses:

One of the basic reasons for genocide is a conflict of culture as it appeared for example in the migrating nomadic societies and sedentary ones. Also this conflict was particularly violent when the ideas of the absolute appeared in the course of the encounter of various religions. The economic and political expectations which were attached to the annihilation of a group worked always as a generating force of genocide. Also colonialism cannot be left without blame. The basic difficulty consists in the fact that the standards of conduct between individuals disappear in relations between one group and another.³⁹

It is immediately evident that Lemkin did not set store on inter-group enmity as the starting point for explaining genocide. Such enmity arose from dramatic transformations in the interaction between migratory and sedentary and societies. Material factors were consequently important.⁴⁰

At the same time, emotional factors were paramount to mobilizing a population for genocidal violence. As he made clear in a draft chapter called "The Concept of Genocide in Social and Individual Psychology," situational factors were as important as individual and cultural dispositions in leading to genocidal violence.⁴¹ Above all, he appealed to sociology—the discipline that studies societies with generic concepts—for methodological inspiration. Genocide is "primarily sociological, since it means the destruction of certain social groups

by other social groups or their individual representatives."⁴² Accordingly, he was interested in tracing various processes that recurred in genocide, combined differently in each case. Murder was the last resort: "Actual physical destruction is the last and most effective phase of genocide." More commonly, genocide was effected by "political disenfranchisement, economic displacement, cultural undermining and control, the destruction of leadership, the break-up of families and the prevention of propagation."⁴³

Even so, because Lemkin was acutely conscious of cultural difference and contingency in historical events and social processes like genocide, he opposed the application of a single model for each genocide.⁴⁴ Instead, he devised a set of questions for the comparative analysis of historical case studies that would balance careful contextualization with systematic rigor. His template for each case study, reproduced in an abbreviated form below, highlights not only the multi-dimensional nature of genocide but also his eschewal of the Holocaust as a paradigm of genocide.

1. Background-historical
2. Conditions leading to the genocide
3. Methods and techniques of genocide
4. The genocidists
5. Propaganda
6. Responses of victims
7. Responses of outsider groups
8. Aftermath.⁴⁵

He wrote draft chapters on most of the following extensive list. This is how he named and organized the cases:

Antiquity: Canaanites/Biblical genocide, Assyrian invasions, Egypt, Greece, Celts, Carthage, Early Christians, Pagans, Gauls, Genocide in Ancient Greece.

Middle Ages: Goths, Huns, Vandals, Vikings, Charlemagne, Albigenses, Valdenses, England, Jews, Mongols, Moors, the French in Sicily, By the Vikings, Spanish Inquisitions, Genocide against the Moors and the Moriscos, by the Huns, against the Jews. By the Goths. Crusades.

Modern Times: 1. Genocide by the Germans against the Native Africans, 2. Assyrians in Iraq, 3. Belgian Congo, 4. Bulgaria under the Turk, 5. Genocide against the Greeks, 6. Chios, 7. Greeks and Franks, 8. Greeks in Exile from Turkish occupation, 9. Genocide by Greeks against the Turks, 10. Genocide against the Gypsies, 11. Hereros, 12. Haiti, 13. Hottentots, 14. Huguenots, 15. Hungary under the Turks, 16. Genocide against the American Indians, 17. Ireland, 18. Genocide by Janisaries, 19. Genocide by the Japanese against the Catholics, 20. Genocide

against Polish Jews, 21. Genocide against Russian Jews, 22. Genocide against Jews in South Africa, 23. Genocide against Rumanian Jews, 24. Korea, 25. Latin America, 26. Genocide against Aztecs, 27. Yucatan, 28. Genocide against the Incas, 29. Genocide against the Maoris of New Zealand, 30. Genocide against Mennonites, 31. Nuremberg Trials, 32. Paris, 33. Serbs, 34. Slavs, 35. Smyrna, 36. South Africa, 37. Genocide against the Stedinger 38. Tasmanians, 39. Armenians, 40. SW Africa, 41. Natives of Australia.⁴⁶

We do not have the space to examine each chapter but it is worth noting that Lemkin wrote a substantial manuscript on the Nazi policies for the purposes of indicting German leaders for genocide.⁴⁷ As in *Axis Rule*, he treated the persecution and murder of European Jewry as a case of genocide among others perpetrated by the Nazis, noting its distinct features while highlighting its similarities. Ever the sober lawyer, he made the case for their guilt in terms applicable to an international readership with secular premises. Lemkin's was the first account of the "Holocaust and world history" then, but it never saw the light of day. His work was promptly forgotten as the uniqueness thesis began to structure the conceptual approach to the study the Holocaust.

The Holocaust and World History: Following Lemkin's Program

How can one revive Lemkin's method today, more than half a century after he wrote his proposals and draft chapters? How can the Holocaust be made interesting or relevant to world historians who are more interested in themes like climate change, demography, migration, and state-formation? To be of genuine global interest, the Holocaust needs to be deprovincialized from its significance within an exclusively Jewish and western narrative about the triumphant achievement of human rights and genocide prevention. That narrative is simply implausible for large sections of the global population and shows no genuine interest in world history. A world history gaze can illuminate some generic features of genocide that recur in the Holocaust. It does not "diminish" the Holocaust—to name the anxiety of those who insist on its uniqueness—to point out such features. Far more, such an exercise is intrinsic to the program set forth by Lemkin, namely to advance immanent rather than transcendental explanations for its occurrence. Of particular interest is the notion that a people could be a hereditary or blood enemy, which meant that all its members were *ipso facto* guilty, to be exterminated with impunity, indeed with divine warrant. In the following brief exposition, I focus mainly on the concept of "enemy people" since Biblical antiquity as an example for this approach.

It has been often pointed out that the Bible contains numerous examples of genocide by the ancient Israelites of their enemies, although they were no

exception to Near Eastern norms at the time. Significant for genocide studies is that the Bible deals with the fate of peoples. The Amalek, an enemy people of the Israelites, embodied the concept of hereditary enemy. Just as the Bible teaches that their name was to be "blotted out" (Deuteronomy 25:19), their putative genocidal intentions towards the Israelites serve as ready historical analogy for Israeli leaders today.⁴⁸ The Bible was also the source for "the Judeo-Christian history of salvation" in which "the obliteration and replacement of peoples was a principal motor of advance and historical change." Genocide could be thereby imbued with meta-historical significance, as it was for medieval Europeans for whom the Bible provided "ancient prototypes" "for recounting acts of inter-ethnic slaughter."⁴⁹

Other cases in antiquity indicate alternative modalities of enemy people construction. Rome's armies occasionally exterminated entire cities that resisted its rule or rose up in rebellion. To be sure, they did not always destroy the enemy, but nor did they pardon those who could not be trusted. Security considerations dictated their fate.⁵⁰ Punishing and avenging treachery and betrayal, experienced as an insult and expression of contempt, was another motivation for destroying a people or city. Rome's attack on Carthage, which it accused of basic breaches of trust, is a classic example of this modality. Carthage's behavior meant that Rome withdrew the right of pity and limited warfare. Vengeance and indignation drove it to impose mass, collective capital punishment rather than ethnic or racial hatred.⁵¹ Betrayal was also a common theme in Asian and Central Asian empires. The Mongols were acutely conscious of treachery by peoples they had absorbed into the multi-ethnic empires. Peoples who broke alliances—and therefore an oath—by joining the enemy were sometimes exterminated years later by Mongol leaders who did not forget such betrayals.⁵²

Genocidal intentions could also be generated by the other side of the imperial relationship in a phenomenon called "subaltern genocide."⁵³ The total extermination of an enemy people was also a common refrain by Chinese nationalists against the Manchu Dynasty in the late nineteenth century, for example. They were to be pulled "out by the roots" for betraying their oath to protect China from foreign penetration. The Manchus were racialized as a "barbarous lineage"; revenge was to be taken on them for their centuries-long humiliating tutelage over the Chinese.⁵⁴ Also anti-colonial in nature were the peasant insurgencies in nineteenth-century India. Their targets were not only the British occupiers but Indian tribal groups seen as agents or beneficiaries of colonial rule. Such targeting was often collective, directed "against all members of a given class of enemies without pausing to sort out the 'good' individuals among them from the 'bad' and secondly ... [killing] ... out against all classes and sections of the population hostile to the peasantry, irrespective of which-ever of these might have been the rebels' initial object of attack."⁵⁵ The local people shared consanguinity and territory, rigidly distinguishing between locals and alien newcomers. Theirs was a struggle for the homeland against foreign

Indians, members of other tribes who exploited the peasantry and who were held responsible for moral and material decline, especially if they were money lenders and traders, bearers of the incipient commercial economy. Alien influence was coded as the beginning of general decline. The rebels sought to expel or destroy the commercial interloper to recover a harmonious past as future.⁵⁶

At the same time in North America, European settlers were racializing Apache Indians as enemies who were congenitally dangerous to their presence and should therefore be exterminated. This disposition was, by all accounts, the consensus on the frontier.⁵⁷ The tendency to collective thinking of dangerous people was also evident in Imperial Russian elites in their conquest of the Caucasus between the 1830s and 1860s. Noting the French tactics in their pacification of Algeria, the Russians engaged in wholesale population expulsions with virtually genocidal consequences for groups like the Circassians. Decades later, during the Russian Civil war, both Red and White forces routinely "sifted" and "filtered" captured troops and populations for members of suspect groups they regarded as corporate enemy groups. White forces, for instance, executed tens of thousands of Jews, Balts, Chinese, and Communists because they were seen as "incorrigible."⁵⁸

The concept of enemy people (*nyng narodo*) and classes became a central element of the Soviet security paranoia. Stalin thought the so-called Kulaks an irredeemable enemy. Because of their large number and geographical dispersion, he found that expulsion was not an option. Starvation was a substitute policy, with genocidal consequences for Ukrainian and Caucasian peasants.⁵⁹ Less well known but equally devastating was the genocidal deportation in 1943–1944 of the Caucasian peoples, who were accused of collaborating with the Nazi invaders. For their alleged betrayal of the Soviet Fatherland, the Chechens became a "bandit nation"; according to Beria, they were a nation of "active and almost universal participation in the terrorist movement directed against the Soviets and the Red Army."⁶⁰

Since the 1920s, the Soviet leadership had felt encircled by enemies abroad and their agents within Soviet borders: peoples thought to be in league with these foreign enemies were necessarily "unreliable elements," "suspect nations," "nationalities of foreign governments." In this context, leaders could make genocidal statements like this one:

We will annihilate every such enemy, even if he is an old Bolshevik, we will annihilate his entire clan, his family. We will mercilessly annihilate anyone who in actions or thoughts—yes, even in thoughts—who attempts [to undermine] the unity of the socialist state.⁶¹

Security rather than racial imperatives governed the logic of this rhetoric and policy.

Other aspects of genocide can be briefly noted. In all these empires, terror played an important role in conquest and governance. Massacring entire towns

hastened the surrender of others when they heard the news.⁶² The relentless pursuit of enemy peoples is also a recurring feature of genocide through the ages. Sometimes the destruction was total, sometimes it was not. Enemies were pursued to the extent that they no longer represented a threat or that sufficient vengeance had been exacted. Equally important is the question of preemption. We know from Richard Tuck's study of western thought on war and peace that one tradition—expressed by Tacitus and Cicero, for instance—justified pre-emptive strikes against enemies on the basis of fear, glory, and generally *raison d'état*.⁶³ We also know that this justification found application in practice, such as the habit of European settlers to preemptively exterminate indigenous peoples collectively because they might pose a threat. Out of fear or by projecting their own genocidal designs onto the other, settlers murdered entire groups on the basis of the proposition that the Native Americans were apparently bent on destroying them.⁶⁴

Now all these aspects of genocide can be detected in the Nazi genocide of European Jewry: the identification of an enemy people that was incorrigible and morally dangerous, that was responsible for moral and material decline by its commercial activity, that collaborated with and represented foreign enemies, whose fundamental disloyalty was proven by the betrayal of an army in 1917, that was therefore a permanent security risk to attack preemptively and collectively, to be pursued relentlessly, to be terrorized and exterminated. In fact, Hitler referred explicitly to some of these cases—particularly the Romans and the Mongols—in justifying his stance and policies.⁶⁵ The Nazis concocted their own genocidal amalgam of these historical examples. To point to their presence in the Holocaust is not to suggest that it is “just like any other genocide in world history”—the dreaded “relativization” of the Holocaust. It is to note, as Lemkin did, that genocides, for all their variation, share recurring features that congeal in different constellations in different conjunctures. It goes without saying that branding “the Jews” an enemy people was based on fantastical notions of global conspiracy—just as paranoia and accusations of “ethnic guilt” that pronounce civilians to be potential security risks is present, in varying degrees, in genocides generally.⁶⁶

Conclusion

What then of “the Holocaust and world history”? Lemkin studied both scientifically as he would any history and any genocide; he seems not to have invested the Holocaust with any metahistorical significance. Taking the perspective of the *longue durée* naturally told against such investment. He observed patterns of immanence rather than transcendence, the quotidian rise and fall of nations and empires, rather than moments of world-historical significance. His own assumption was that the norm of diversity resisted the imposition of

homogeneity. Note how he includes the Nazi regime in this list of homogenizing empires:

At different stages of history some cultures have been stronger, some have been weaker, but the diversity of cultures in the world has been aspired to from earliest times. And once a tendency was felt to impose one culture upon the rest of the world, like in the case of Greece, Rome, Assyria, France (under Louis XVI), Nazi Germany under Hitler, this tendency was always broken up by counter-forces which ultimately secure the principle of diversity.⁶⁷

Despite his valorization of cultural difference, he was no cultural relativist, believing that the West, as the origin of humanitarian international law, was the motor of civilizational development. It drove the transition from the barbarism of total warfare and wars of extermination of antiquity and the Middle Ages to the modern laws of war and occupation with their distinction between civilians and combatants. If this view, shared by other liberal Jews of his generation like Norbert Elias, has been powerfully challenged by critics who associate genocide and the Holocaust with modernity, his nascent theory of cultural learning processes is worth recalling. Memory of genocide spurs the effort to prevent it, perhaps a secular manifestation of the Jewish notion that “the secret of redemption is memory.”⁶⁸

The history of genocide displays the presence of a vicious circle. The preservation of nations contributes to the creation and development of original cultures. However, the presence of original cultures in certain, especially limnithophe [border zones, ADMJ], areas of the world caused cultural conflicts and genocide. It also created the concern to prevent genocide by permitting the natural development and co-existence of cultures without excluding one another by violent means.⁶⁹

The terrible events of World War II “created the concern to prevent genocide,” he noted, because they “shocked the conscience of mankind,” as the UN General Assembly put it in 1946. Contrary to the common view that the Holocaust was the impetus for the drafting of the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the Genocide Convention, the Nazi genocide *and* persecution of many other groups—that is, genocide—was the international community’s point of reference: the Holocaust was not a term used at the time, after all.⁷⁰

What of his legacy today? World histories of genocide are being written, alas with no regard for Lemkin’s work.⁷¹ The best recent scholarship on the Holocaust to embody the Lemkinian spirit is Donald Bloxham’s tellingly-titled study of the Holocaust, *The Final Solution: A Genocide*.⁷² A genuine comparativist with expertise in war crimes trials, the Armenian genocide, and geopolitics since the Eastern crisis of the 1870s,⁷³ Bloxham reasons inductively, showing how the Nazi policies grew out of but also exceeded the ethnic warfare in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. Along the way, he dispels of the uniqueness myth that the Nazis intended the total destruction of the Jews, while also referencing Lemkin’s observation that “crippling” a group was genocidal because it destroyed its agency and prevented its reproduction.

Defly negotiating the complex historiography of the field, he shows that any one paradigm, whether industrial killing, modernity, antisemitism or imperialism cannot do justice to the Holocaust's complexity, which was, ultimately, a multi-causal event. In the manner of Lemkin, then, Bloxham has successfully deprovincialized Holocaust scholarship.

A world history approach to the Holocaust must also do more than engage in the usual comparative calculus. It must ask after its location in the world system of empire- and nation-states. Mark Levene is the historian to have most systematically pursued this question. Abjuring the distinction between ancient and modern genocide, he thinks the twentieth century *context* is distinctive. Unique is the development of competitive nation-states in a system dominated by old core powers accompanied by newcomers like the United States. Those that wish to catch up, like Imperial Germany whose challenge to the established order had been defeated in World War I, scapegoat domestic minorities held responsible for hindering resource mobilization or betraying previous efforts to break into or dominate the system. This pattern of revisionist challenges to the core powers and the system they govern, exemplified by the Nazi, Soviet, Japanese, and Italian empires of the 1930s and 1940s, are the global context for the genocides of that period.⁷⁴ To ask about the Holocaust and world history, then, takes us far from the uniqueness claim, where we began, to a global frame and a genuine interest in all civilizations and cultures facing the challenge of imposing and resisting hegemony in a competitive system of nation- and empire-states. Explicit or implicit ascriptions of transcendent meaning in world history, in particular about the evils of antisemitism or imperialism, can be replaced by middle-range inquiry amenable to empirical testing.

Notes

1. Thanks to Avriil Alba, Donald Bloxham, Nick Doumanis, Yoram Horan, Geoffrey Brahm Levey, Dan Stone, and Naama Wizenley for critical feedback on drafts of this chapter. An elaborated version of the argument will appear in my *Genocide and the Terror of History*, forthcoming.
2. Heinrich Grunz, "The Diaspora: Suffering and Spirit" in *Modern Jewish Thought: A Source Reader*, ed. Nehum H. Glazer (New York, 1977), 20.
3. Saul Friedländer, "The Historical Significance of the Holocaust," in *The Holocaust as Historical Experience*, ed. Yehuda Bauer and Nathan R. Grossmann (New York, 1981), 2-4, 15.
4. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York, 1996), 412. For my critique of this proposition, see A. Dirk Moses, "Permanence and Partisanship: Genocide Studies, Holocaust Historiography and the Apocalyptic Conjunction," *The Historical Journal* 15, no. 2 (2011): 615-45.
5. Steven T. Katz made this thesis the center of his book, *The Holocaust and Historical Context* (Oxford, 1994), an exhaustive examination of other genocides in world history that, he contends, do not evade the intention for total destruction that characterizes the Holocaust.
6. Frank Chalk, "The Ultimate Ideological Genocide," in *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analysis and Case Studies*, ed. Frank Chalk and Kurt Janssen (New Haven, 1990), 325.

7. Uriel Tal, "Forms of Pseudo-Religion in the German Kulturereich Prior to the Holocaust," *Immanus* 3 (1973-1974): 68-75.
8. Dan Diner, *Beyond the Conventicle: Studies on German Nazism, and the Holocaust* (Berkeley, 2000), 3. Diner also invokes the first version of the uniqueness claim.
9. Grunz, "Diaspora," 22.
10. Ze'ev Tshar, "Ben-Gurion's Mythopoeics," *Israel Affairs* 1, no. 3 (1995): 65.
11. Shimon Peres address at opening ceremony of Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Remembrance Day, 20 April 2009, www.fm.gov.il/MEF/AnnSeminar+and+the+Holocaust/Documents+and+communications/President_Peris_opening_ceremony_Holocaust_Remembrance_Day_20-Apr-2009.htm.
12. The Israeli representative at the UN noted, "The Holocaust constituted a systematic and barbarous attempt to annihilate an entire people, in a manner and magnitude that have no parallel in human history" and observed its consequences: "By so shocking the conscience of humankind, the Holocaust served as a critical impetus for the development of human rights, the drafting of landmark international conventions, such as the Genocide Convention, and for the very establishment of this organization." See Dan Gitterman, Israeli Permanent Representative to the United Nations, statement at the 60th meeting of the General Assembly, 31 October 2005, <http://israel-mfa.gov.il/statements-at-the-united-nations/holocaust-remembrance/agenda-item-72-holocaust-remembrance-31-october-2005>. Cf. Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age* (Philadelphia, 2006).
13. Grunz, "Diaspora," 21.
14. W. E. B. Du Bois, *The World and Africa* (Millwood, NY, 1967), 23.
15. Wole Soyinka, *The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness* (New York, 1999), 38-39.
16. Franz Fanon, *Black Skin/White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (London, 1986), 115-16, 180-92.
17. Arif Dirlik, "Performing the World: Reality and Representation in the Making of World Histories," *Journal of World History* 16, no. 4 (2005): 391-92.
18. Cf. Dan Stone, "The Historiography of Genocide: Beyond 'Uniqueness' and Ethnic Competition," *Rethinking History* 8, no. 1 (2004): 127-42. Stone, *Histories of the Holocaust* (Oxford, 2010), ch. 5.
19. Raphael Lemkin, "Autobiography," "First Love and Early Education" chapter, New York Public Library, Lemkin Collection, Box 1, Reel 2, Folder 37. I have corrected Lemkin's spelling in the quotations from his unpublished writings.
20. Raphael Lemkin, "Genocide in Economics," New York Public Library, Lemkin Collection, Box 2, Reel 2, Folder 2.
21. Raphael Lemkin, "Totally Unofficial Man," in *Pioneers of Genocide Studies*, ed. Samuel Toten and Stephen L. Jacobs (New Brunswick, 2002), 370-72.
22. A. Dirk Moses, "Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide," in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (Oxford, 2010), 19-41.
23. Lemkin, "Autobiography," New York Public Library, Lemkin Collection, Box 1, Reel 2, Folder 36, 2.
24. John Cooper, *Raphael Lemkin and the Genocide Convention* (Houndmills, 2008), 10, 23, 58-59; Yehuda Bauer, "The Place of the Holocaust in History," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 2 (1987): 211-12, 215; Katz, *Holocaust in Historical Context*, 129-30 n. 15.
25. Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, DC, 1944), 90 (emphasis added).
26. Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, 89, 81; cf. 249-50, 77, 21-22.
27. Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, 80 n. 3. The book was finished in 1943 but negotiations with the publishers delayed its appearance by a year. See Cooper, *Raphael Lemkin and the Genocide Convention*, 54.
28. Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, 80.
29. Raphael Lemkin, "Introduction into Part 1: The New Word and the New Idea," New York Public Library, Lemkin Collection, Box 2, Reel 2, Folder 2, 1.

30. Raphael Lemkin, "Memorandum on the Genocide Convention," American Jewish Historical Association, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 6, Folder 5.
31. His research was financed by a special "Genocide Research Fund" at Yale Law School, to which donors contributed. See Harry Starr, Lucius N. Littner Foundation to Lemkin, 13 February 1951, American Jewish Historical Association, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 8, Folder 10.
32. Lemkin to Paul Fejos, Viking Fund, 22 July 1948, American Jewish Historical Association, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 8, Folder 10.
33. Lemkin, "Totally Unofficial Man," 390.
34. College Roundtable: United Nations: Genocide Convention (undated), American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Collection 60, Box 4, Folder 2, 2.
35. A typical rejection letter from Roger F. Evans, Rockefeller Foundation, to Lemkin, 6 November 1947, New York Jewish Historical Association, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 8, Folder 10.
36. Studies of these manuscripts can be found in Dominik Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer, eds., *The Origins of Genocide: Raphael Lemkin as a Historian of Mass Violence* (Abingdon, 2009), and Cooper, *Raphael Lemkin and the Genocide Convention*, chs. 15 and 16.
37. Raphael Lemkin, "Description of the Project" (undated), New York Public Library, Lemkin Collection, Box 2, Red 3, Folder 1, 2.
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*, 4.
40. *Ibid.*
41. Raphael Lemkin, "The Concept of Genocide in Social and Individual Psychology," New York Public Library, Lemkin Collection, Roll 2, Folder 2.
42. Raphael Lemkin, "The Concept of Sociology in Sociology," New York Public Library, Lemkin Collection, Box 2, Roll 2, Folder 2. Cf. Martin Shaw, "Sociology and Genocide," in Bloxham and Moses, *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, 142–62.
43. Lemkin, "The Concept of Sociology in Sociology."
44. Raphael Lemkin, "Reflections on Cure and Treatment," New York Public Library, Lemkin Collection, Box 2, Red 2, Folder 2. "It is therefore useless to apply to it [genocided] the same standards and methods used by chemists or biologists."
45. Raphael Lemkin, "Revised Outline for Genocide Cases," American Jewish Historical Association, Lemkin Collection, P-154, Box 8, Folder 11. This is the bare list: each subheading was supplemented by considerable detail.
46. Lemkin, "Description of the Project," 5. Unfortunately, case "41, Natives of Australia" has not been located. It would be a great service to genocide scholars for these chapters to be published. So far, only his chapter on the Aboriginal Tasmanians has been reprinted, along with an extended commentary by Ann Curthoys: "Raphael Lemkin's 'Tasmania': An Introduction," *Partners of Psychiatry* 39, no. 2 (2005): 162–69; Raphael Lemkin, "Tasmania," in Curthoys, "Raphael Lemkin's 'Tasmania,'" 170–96 (both are reprinted in Moses and Stone, *Genocide and Colonialism*, 66–73, 74–100).
47. Raphael Lemkin, *Raphael Lemkin's Thoughts on Nazi Genocide: Not Guilty?*, ed. Steven L. Jacobs (Lewisson, 1992). Cf. Dan Stone, "Raphael Lemkin on the Holocaust," *Journal of Genocide Research* 7, no. 4 (2005): 539–50.
48. Louis H. Feldman, "Remember Amalek!": *Yevgeny, Zolotny, and Group Destruction in the Bible According to Philo, Pseudo-Philo, and Josephus* (Cincinnati, 2004), chs. 7 and 8; Jeffrey Goldberg, "Israel's Fears, Amalek's Arsenal," *New York Times*, 17 May 2009.
49. Len Scales, "Brend, Cheese and Genocide: Imagining the Destruction of Peoples in Medieval Western Europe," *History* 92 (2007): 294–95, 287.
50. Benjamin Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity* (Princeton, 2004), 216.
51. David Koza, "Anger, Hatred, and Genocide in Ancient Greece," *Common Knowledge* 13, no. 1 (2007): 170–87.
52. John Joseph Saunders, *The History of the Mongol Conquests* (Philadelphia, 2001), ch. 4.

53. Nicholas A. Robins and Adam Jones, eds., *Genocides by the Oppressed: Subaltern Genocide in Theory and Practice* (Bloomington, 2009); A. Dirk Moses, ed., *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation and Subaltern Resistance in World History* (New York, 2008).
54. Peter Perdue, "Enslaving the Empire, Re-racing the Nation: Racism and Culturalism in Imperial China," in *Imperial Formations*, ed. Ann Laura Stoler, Gwelo McGraham and Peter Perdue (Santa Fe, 2007), 141–72.
55. Ranjit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (Durham, 1999), 24.
56. *Ibid.*, 279–95.
57. Karl Jacoby, "'The Broad Platform of Extermination': Nature and Violence in the Nineteenth Century North American Borderlands," *Journal of Genocide Research* 10, no. 2 (2008): 249–67.
58. Peter Holquist, "Violent Russia, Deadly Marxism? Russia in the Epoch of Violence, 1905–1921," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 4, no. 3 (2005): 627–52.
59. Michael Elmann, "The Role of Leadership Perceptions and of Intent in the Soviet Famine of 1931–1934," *Europe-Asia Studies* 57, no. 6 (2005): 823–41.
60. Jeffrey Burds, "The Soviet War against 'Fifth Columnists': The Case of Chechnya, 1942–4," *Journal of Contemporary History* 42, no. 2 (2007): 270.
61. *Ibid.*, 283.
62. Saunders, *The History of the Mongol Conquests*, 56; Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*, 216.
63. Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace* (Oxford, 1999), 11–13, 18–23.
64. Jacoby, "'The Broad Platform of Extermination,'" 252.
65. A. Dirk Moses, "Redemptive Anti-Semitism and the Imperialist Imaginary," in *Years of Persuasion, Years of Extermination: Saul Friedländer and the Future of Holocaust Studies*, ed. Christian Wiese and Paul Bets (London, 2010), 233–54.
66. Cf. Moses, "Paranoia and Partisanship."
67. Raphael Lemkin, "Part I, Ch. II, Sec. II: The Nature of the Group Concerned," American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Collection 6, Box 7, Folder 7/2, 3.
68. Andreas Huyssen, *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory* (Stanford, 2003), 32; Stone, "Genocide and Memory," in Bloxham and Moses, *Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, 102–19.
69. Lemkin, "Description of the Project," 5.
70. Synponatic in conflating the war experience with the Holocaust is Johannes Morstink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent* (Philadelphia, 1999). For an alternative reading, see Donald Bloxham, *Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History* (Oxford, 2001).
71. For example, Ben Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur* (New Haven, 2007).
72. Donald Bloxham, *The Final Solution: A Genocide* (Oxford, 2009).
73. Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford, 2005); Bloxham, *Genocide, the World Wars, and the Unmaking of Europe* (London, 2008).
74. Mark Levene, *Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State*, vol. 1, *The Meaning of Genocide* (London, 2005).

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